This paper explores the link between international specialization across goods and within goods along the quality dimension. The analysis is performed in a multi-country model with an integer number of e ciency heterogeneous firms producing each good and under reasonably general assumptions on the shape of firm e ciency distributions and market structure. In equilibrium, each country exports a range of qualities for each good that overlaps with the ranges of other countries following patterns that relate to di↵erences in wages, trade frictions and absolute advantage. If firm e ciency is quality biased (i.e., the relative productivity of more-e cient firms is higher when producing higher quality) then, conditional on wages, the average quality of the exports within an industry increases with the country's international specialization in that industry.
Introduction
Empirical research has shown that accounting for both specialization across goods and specialization within goods along the quality dimension is indispensable for interpreting the current patterns of international trade. 1 Although existing models of trade tend to focus on either one or the other of these dimensions, the two are likely to be connected. Figure 1 is suggestive of the potential relationship. For several products, this figure shows a positive correlation between the unit value of US imports from di↵erent countries (where unit value is interpreted as a proxy for quality) and the exporting country's revealed comparative advantage in the corresponding product (see Section 5 for details). In these examples, a positive relationship between the two variables is apparent and holds regardless of whether or not the sample of exporting countries is split into di↵erent groups according to their income level.
This paper analyzes the potential link between specialization across goods and specialization within goods along the quality dimension. The main result is that the countries that are specialized in a given good tend to export a higher average quality of that good (conditional on wages and other variables). The analysis is performed in a multi-country model with an integer number of industries, each of which is composed by an integer number of heterogeneous producers, and under reasonably general assumptions on the distribution of firm e ciencies and market structure.
The heterogeneity of producers in terms of e ciency and export status, within each industry and country, is large and has fundamental implications for understanding the consequences of trade, as shown by a recent and growing literature. 2 In turn, working with models that have an integer number of firms is important because, as stated by Eaton, Kortum and Sotelo (2012) , it is di cult to reconcile the small number of firms engaged in selling from one country to another and the many country bilateral trade flows that are zero, with a continuum of firms. As a result of these features, in this model's equilibrium, each good tends to be exported to each market by multiple firms (but not by an infinite number of firms) and from more than one country (but not necessarily from all of the countries). Moreover, countries tend to export a wide but finite range of qualities for every product. In this regard, the model provides simple but intuitive predictions on how the ranges in the quality for each good exported by di↵erent countries overlap according to di↵erences in wages, trade frictions, and absolute advantage.
1 On the importance of the quality dimension, see Schott (2004) , Hummels and Klenow (2005) , Khandelwal (2010) and Hallak and Schott (2011) among a rapidly expanding literature. Throughout the paper, we refer to specialization across goods as horizontal specialization and to specialization within goods along the quality dimension as vertical specialization.
2 On the empirics of trade and firm heterogeneity, see Bernard and Jensen (1995) for pioneering work and Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011) for recent influential research. See Bernard et al. (2003) and Melitz (2003) for pathbreaking general equilibrium models. Redding (2011) and Bernard et al. (2012) review this literature.
At the firm level, the key assumption of the model is quality-biased e ciency. Quality-biased e ciency means that the relative productivity of two firms increases in favor of the most e cient firm as production shifts toward higher quality. 3 Formally, quality-biased e ciency means that firm productivity is log-supermodular in firm e ciency and product quality. Costinot (2009) has shown that log-supermodularity provides a unifying principle that underlies numerous results in international trade. The quality bias of productivity is a common (often implicit) hypothesis in models with heterogeneous firms and quality di↵erentiation and has received empirical support using data from the US and other countries. 4 In this model, quality-biased e ciency at the firm level translates into a connection at the country level between specialization across goods and the average export quality of each good. The argument can be outlined as follows. Firms from a country that has an absolute advantage (AA; to be precisely defined below) in a given industry j will, on average, be more e cient than the firms from other countries. Thus, if e ciency is quality biased, then the firms from this country and industry will, on average, produce higher quality than their competitors. Moreover, if the country has an AA in j over another country and a lower wage, then it will tend to be relatively specialized in industry j. Thus, conversely, a higher specialization in industry j with respect to another country and a higher wage, implies that the country has as an AA in j. Therefore, noting that there is also a direct link between wages and quality, countries with higher specialization in j and higher wages should export higher average quality of j.
Developing this argument under reasonably general assumptions on the distribution of firm e ciencies and market structure involves dealing with three primary aggregation issues. First, absolute advantage must be defined. First-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) may appear to be the natural concept to be used to order country distributions of firm e ciencies within each industry. However, we show with a numerical example that FOSD is not su cient to guarantee a basic property for AA orders whenever we depart from the particularly well-behaved Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition (DSMC) model. This property is that if country i 0 has an AA over country i 00 in industry j, then the exporters of j from i 0 have greater average productivity than those from i 00 . Rather, the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), which is satisfied by continuous distributions commonly used in the trade literature such as Pareto and Fréchet and can also be used in models with a discrete distribution of firms, guarantees this property. Thus, we define a country to have an AA over another country in a given industry if for any two categories of firm e ciency, the ratio of the number of firms in the high-e ciency category to the number in the low-e ciency category is larger in the first country. Using this definition, we can demonstrate that, conditional on wages, firms from a country that has an AA on a given good will produce it with higher average quality.
Second, the e↵ect of wages and trade frictions on the countries' average export quality depend on how wages and trade frictions a↵ect the relative market shares of firms that produce di↵erent qualities. However, the sign of this e↵ect can be uncertain. For instance, we know that the market shares of firms from countries with higher wages and trade frictions will be smaller (for any given e ciency). However, as wages and trade frictions increase, it is possible that the less-e cient firms' market shares are reduced relatively less than the more-e cient firms' market shares. 5 This would imply that the exporters from countries that have higher wages and trade frictions feature lower average e ciency and export quality (at least for a certain range of these variables). We show that the condition guaranteeing that countries with higher wages and trade frictions (conditional on AA) export higher average quality is that the cross derivative of the log of market share with respect to wages and e ciency is positive. Third, country specialization across goods is not only the result of the average output per firm in each industry but also of the relative number of firms in each industry. Thus, to analyze horizontal specialization we need to endogenize the number of firms. We use a static zero-profit condition to endogenize firms and show that the country's relative exports in a given industry are larger in the economies with a stronger AA and a lower wage. The key assumption to reach this latter result is that the cross derivative of the operating profits with respect to trade frictions and the industry's price index is negative.
DSMC and Cournot competition 6 are two prominent cases of market structures that meet the two aforementioned key assumptions on the cross derivative of the log of market shares with respect to wages and e ciency, and the cross derivative of the operating profits with respect to trade frictions and the industry's price index. Note that these two models represent opposing market structures from the point of view of the response of prices and markups to di↵erences in firm e ciency. The combination of the MLRP on the firm e ciency distributions and the two cited cross-derivative assumptions appear to provide a fruitful and fairly general basis for the analysis of aggregates (such as average productivity and quality) in models with heterogeneous producers. It might be conjectured that some qualitative results in the trade literature that have been developed in the context of particular firm e ciency distributions such as Pareto or Fréchet and particular market structures such as DSMC could be generalized to this framework.
The contribution of this paper is theoretical. However, it is appropriate to provide an empirical illustration of the model's main prediction. Thus, we explore the correlation between horizontal specialization and export average quality for a particular sector, apparel and clothing accessories, using unit values as a proxy for quality and data on US imports. The apparel and clothing accessories sector has the largest number of exporting countries to the US and includes many products with large variations in unit values. We run regressions pooling together the data for all of the 233 6-digit goods in chapters 61 and 62 of the HS-1996 classification, and independent regressions for the 113 goods of these two chapters that have at least 50 exporting countries. Overall, the results of this limited exercise appear to be consistent with the main implication of the model: conditional on wages, horizontal specialization tends to be positively correlated with export unit values. However, conducting a proper test of the theory is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research. Although there are sometimes direct measures of quality (e.g., Crozet, Head and Mayer, 2012) , empirical work on quality typically involves using unit values as proxies, as we do in our exercise. However, unit values may not be a good proxy for quality. In monopolistic competition markets, the more-e cient firms may sell larger quantities at lower prices even if they produce higher quality. This is especially problematic for the use of prices as a proxy for quality when, as in this paper, we are interested in the link between relatively high sales (horizontal specialization), which may tend to lower prices, and high quality. Hence, conducting a proper test of the theory will require a more sophisticated empirical approach to capture export quality than the unit-value approach followed in our empirical exercise. 7
This paper is related to several strands of the trade literature. Early models of specialization along the quality dimension assume either only one vertically di↵erentiated good in the economy (together with a non-di↵erentiated good) or only one quality level per good at each point in time. 7 See Khandelwal (2010), Hallak and Schott (2011) and Romalis (2012) for di↵erent approaches that go beyond prices to capture export quality. At any rate, while low unit values may not be indicative of low quality if sales are high, high unit values together with high relative sales (high horizontal specialization) are di cult to explain without referring to high quality.
8 This includes Flam and Helpman (1987) , Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) , Grossman and Helpman (1991) , Stokey (1991), Copeland and Kotwal (1996) and Murphy and Shleifer (1997) .
Therefore, there is no room for interaction between horizontal and vertical specializations. Most of the recent general equilibrium trade models with heterogeneous producers are set in terms of homogeneous quality goods but can often be reinterpreted as models with quality di↵erentiation.
However, this reinterpretation may involve a trivial distinction between quantity and quality that leaves undetermined the product of the quantity times quality being produced. The distinction between quantity and quality becomes relevant from the point of view of the supply when di↵erent firms have di↵erent comparative advantage for producing quality. In this paper, this variation in comparative advantage arises from the assumption of quality-biased e ciency.
The model also introduces an industry-country component of firm e ciency (this is done by assuming an AA order of countries in each industry, according to the definition of AA given above).
The concept of industry is central to the literature on comparative advantage and to our analysis of specialization across goods but is absent from many of the recent general equilibrium models with heterogeneous producers. Notable heterogeneous-firm trade models in which this concept does play an important role are Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) who analyze comparative advantage in a two-country two-factor two-industry model, and Chor (2010) and Costinot, Donaldson and Komunjeer (2012) who build on Eaton and Kortum (2002) and consider a multi-good multi-country economy. As we discuss later, Costinot, Donaldson and Komunjeer (2012) is the closest to the present paper, although they do not consider the quality dimension of specialization and, in contrast to our market structure and firm distribution framework, they assume perfect competition and Fréchet distributions.
The link here between the exporters' technology and specialization along the quality dimension has a Ricardian flavor, in contrast to other approaches to export quality that emphasize di↵erences in factor-proportions (Schott, 2004) and home-market e↵ects (Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman, 2011) . In turn, the approach in this paper to deal with a finite number of firms also di↵ers from Eaton, Kortum, and Sotelo (2012) , who assume specific firm e ciency distributions in order to parameterize the model and assess its quantitative implications.
One important simplification of this model lies in the structure of demand. The model assumes the same homothetic demand with perfect quantity and quality substitutability in all countries. To be sure, non-homotheticies are important in shaping the patterns of trade along the quality dimension (see Hallak 2006 , Choi, Hummels and Xiang 2009 , Fieler 2011 , Hallak and Schott 2011 , Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman 2011 , and Feenstra and Romalis 2012 . However, demand homotheticity proves to be a very useful simplification to derive new relevant predictions, whereas there is no reason to expect that non-homotheticities would reverse these predictions. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the model. Section 3 analyzes specialization within goods along the quality dimension. Section 4 extends the model to endogenize the number of firms in order to analyze specialization across goods and to link it with the average export quality.
Section 5 presents the empirical illustration. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
We consider a static model. There are J goods or industries indexed by j (the terms good and industry are used interchangeably throughout this paper) and I countries indexed by i when we refer to them as production sources and by n when as destinations. Every good can be produced along a continuum of qualities q 2 (0, 1). Labor is the only factor of production. It is perfectly mobile across industries and immobile across countries. Country i has an inelastic labor supply of L i > 0 units, which is equal to its population. In each country and industry, there is a finite set of potential producers, which are heterogeneous in terms of their productive e ciency. Each firm's e ciency is parameterized by an index z 2 Z, where Z ⌘ {z 0 , z 1 , . . . , z} is a set with an integer number of potential e ciencies in ascending order (i.e., z t < z t+1 <z for t 2 N) with
0. The number of firms in country i and industry j that have e ciency z is m j i (z) 2 N. In this and the following sections, we analyze the model's equilibrium for any exogenous vector of firms (m j i (z)) 2 N J⇥I⇥Z such that there is more than one potential producer of each good; i.e.,
In Section 4, we endogenize this vector of firms by imposing a zero-profit condition.
Setting

Consumers
We consider a two-level (across goods and within goods) utility function. Utility across goods is Cobb-Douglas. For each good j, each of the m j potential firms produces a di↵erent variety, which may or may not be a perfect substitute of the other firms' varieties. At this point, we assume a generic functional form V (.) for the utility within goods although, later in this section, we introduce further assumptions and consider the particular cases of CES preferences and of no horizontal di↵erentiation. The key assumption maintained throughout the paper is the perfect substitutability from the point of view of consumption between the quantity and quality of each good. Formally, we assume that in every country n = 1, . . . , I, there is a representative consumer that maximizes the following utility function:
where for each good j, ↵ j > 0 is the expenditure share in the good (i.e.,
⌘ is a vector in R m j + , 9 where y j n (k) is the number of units of firm k's output being consumed and q j n (k) is this firm's output quality; and the lower tier utility function V j (.) : R m j + ! R is symmetric with respect to all of its arguments, strictly increasing and concave.
Let p j n (k, q) be the price of firm k's output of good j in destination n, which depends on the quality q that the firm produces, and let Y n be country n's aggregate income. Thus, the consumer
. Now, let e y j n (k) be the consumption of firm k's output in quality-adjusted units (e y j n (k) ⌘ y j n (k)q j n (k)) and e p j n (k) be the price of firm k's output in destination n if the quality it produces were equal to one (e p j n (k) ⌘ p j n (k, 1)). Because, for each firm, consumers only care about the total number of quality-adjusted units per firm, utility maximization yields
for any q. Moreover, utility maximization and Cobb-Douglas utility implies that the expenditure of country n in good j is ↵ j Y n for each n and j. Thus, the demand for firm k's output (k = 1, . . . , m j ) in industry j and market n, in terms of quality-adjusted units, can be expressed as
where
is the vector of prices of good j in destination n for all the potential producers of j excluding firm k.
Throughout the paper we use the DSMC and Cournot market structures as two prominent particular cases that fit our model. In the first case, the lower tier utility function in (1) takes the
, where j > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between two varieties of good j. In the Cournot model without horizontal di↵erentiation, the second tier utility function becomes
Producers and quality-biased e ciency
Firms choose which quality and how many units to produce. The output (in physical units) of a firm in industry j with e ciency z producing quality q and employing l units of labor is given by the following production function:
9 We employ the following standard notation: R n ++ is the set of strictly positive vectors in R n , whereas R n + is the set of all nonnegative vectors in R n .
Thus, there are constant returns to scale to produce any good and quality. However, increasing output quality comes at the cost of fewer units of output per worker. For each quality, higher e ciency z allows the production of more units with the same amount of labor. In turn, as we discuss below, the parameter j (which is restricted to j > 1) captures the quality bias of e ciency in industry j.
We assume iceberg trade frictions: to deliver one unit of good j from source country i to destination country n, the producer must ship d can also be interpreted as an inverse measure of the country's market access, which can be specific for each good. Now, the constant marginal cost for a firm from country i and e ciency z to produce good j with quality q and deliver it to destination n is
whereas its marginal cost of producing and delivering one quality-adjusted unit is e c j ni (z) = c j ni (z, q)/q. Note that the more-e cient firms have a comparative advantage to produce higher quality if and only if j > 0. To see this point, consider two firms with e ciencies z 1 , z 2 2 Z such that z 1 > z 2 , and a pair of qualities q 1 > q 2 > 0. Then, it is immediately apparent that
Equilibrium
Cost minimization and quality Firms from the same country and industry that have the same e ciency face a symmetric demand and identical cost parameters and will take identical quality and quantity or price choices. Thus, from now on we index firm variables by the source country i and the firm's e ciency z rather than by the index k. Hence, x j ni (z) is the sales of good j in destination n by a firm from country i that has e ciency z, and e x j ni (z) is its sales in terms of quality-adjusted units; i.e., e x j ni (z) = x j ni (z)q j ni (z). For each destination country n, the firm maximizes its profit
i with respect to its output quality and price or quantity, taking as given the demand function (3), the destination market income, the home country wage, and the other firms' choices.
The firm's maximization program can be separated into two parts. The first part of the program is to choose the optimal quality to minimize the marginal cost of delivering each quality-adjusted unit of output, e c j ni (z), which is independent of the decision on the number of units to be delivered or its quality-adjusted price. From cost minimization with respect to q, we find that
Hence, more-e cient firms in industry j produce higher quality goods if and only if j > 0. Thus, if j > 0, then we say that e ciency in industry j is quality biased, whereas if j = 0 or j < 0 then e ciency is quality neutral or has a negative quality bias, respectively. The empirical evidence cited in the Introduction identifies a positive link between firm e ciency and output quality and is, therefore, supportive of the case of quality-biased e ciency.
It can be shown that the general condition for the positive link between e ciency and quality at the firm level is that marginal costs c(z, q) are log-submodular in e ciency and quality (i.e., @ 2 ln c(z, q)/@z@q < 0). However, using the particular production function in (4) leads to a simple expression for the marginal cost that is directly related to its standard expression in Ricardian trade models. Under optimal quality choices, the labor required by a firm with e ciency z to produce and ship one quality unit from i to n is d 
Market shares
Next, we consider the (partial) equilibrium of the market for good j in destination n. The parameters of the market are the vector of firms producing j,
. . , w I ) 2 R I ++ and the demand function for each firm's output, which is given by eq. (3). Given the market structure and the corresponding conditions for market equilibrium and firm profit maximization, we can determine the equilibrium prices e p j ni (z) and quantities e x j ni (z), as well as firm market shares s
. For the purpose of this Section, which describes the model and shows that it has an equilibrium, it is su cient to consider the following assumption. In Sections 3 and 4, which characterize the equilibrium, we require and discuss several additional assumptions on the market share and profit functions.
A.1 In each market n of each good j: It is straightforward to verify that the DSMC market structure with no fixed cost of exporting to each market satisfies this assumption by recalling that for this market structure (and suppressing
where e p n =
. 10 Next, we consider the Cournot equilibrium and show that it also satisfies this assumption.
The Cournot case
We now discuss in some detail the equilibrium under Cournot competition without horizontal di↵erentiation, which leads to several interesting predictions that stand in contrast to the DSMC model. In the following section, we also use the Cournot market structure to build a numerical example showing that certain arguments on average e ciency and quality that can be made within the theoretical framework of the DSMC model and FOSD may not generalize to other market structures. This numerical example motivates the definition of AA that follows in that section.
In the Cournot equilibrium for each good j and destination market n, utility maximization yields e p j ni (z) = e p j n for every i and z, and the firms' demand functions (3) collapse into the following single aggregate demand in quality-adjusted units:
In turn, the market equilibrium condition is
Firms' profit maximization with respect to e x j ni (z) taking as given the other firms' output, yields the following expressions for the equilibrium market shares and the single price in the market:
Note that the last expression is implied by (8) and the equilibrium condition 1 =
, which is equivalent to (7). Using these two expressions, it can be verified that the Cournot equilibrium satisfies Assumption A.1 (see Appendix B, where we start by noting that if the vector (w) of wages is strictly positive, so is the vector of marginal costs
which in turn implies
. This Cournot equilibrium is characterized by the following features: (1) only a subset of the firms selling in the domestic market (i.e., the most e cient firms) also export and only an even more select group export to the more distant destinations; (2) (4) the price e p j n and, therefore, markups decrease with the intensity of competition, which can be defined in terms of the number and average marginal cost of the active competitors in the market (i.e., the right-hand side of expression (9)); 11 and (5) more-e cient firms have higher measured marginal
Point 1 is a common key prediction of trade models with heterogeneous producers. Here, it is implied by the expression that determines the cuto↵ z j ni for firms from source i to be active in destination n. 12 Note that in the Cournot model, this result does not require the existence of fixed costs of selling to each destination. Point 2 is also common to heterogenous-firm trade models with quality di↵erentiation (e.g., Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011) . The predictions in points 3 and 4 on the markups are di↵erent from the implications of the DSMC model (in which markups are identical across all of the firms and do not depend on the competition intensity) and consistent with the empirical evidence, which shows substantial heterogeneity and variability in markups across firms and time. Point 5 is also in contrast to the DSMC model, in which measured marginal productivity is constant across the firms from the same source country regardless of di↵erences in e ciency.
11 Other models that generate endogenous variable markups include Bernard et al. (2003) , who consider Bertrand competition, and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), who consider non-CES utility and monopolistic competition.
12 To see this, note that arbitrage implies that the e ciency cuto↵s are higher for exporting than for selling in the domestic market. That is, the no arbitrage condition d Under Cournot, trade liberalizations also have a pro-competitive e↵ect on markups that is absent in the models based on DSMC such as Melitz (2003) . This e↵ect can easily be seen by considering a trade liberalization in a market n for good j su ciently small such that we can take the destination country's income Y n and the vector of wages (w 1 , . . . , w I ) as constant. A reduction in trade frictions d j ni increases the markups of the exporters to n from each source country i 6 = n and reduces those of country n firms in their home market (besides increasing the number and market shares of exporters and reducing those of the domestic producers). 13 As pointed out in the Introduction, empirical studies find that greater exposure to international competition has a significant impact on markups and that this impact can be quantitatively important for the gains from trade (e.g., Tybout, 2003 , Feenstra and Weinstein, 2010 , Edmond, Midrigan and Xu, 2013 .
General equilibrium
The model is closed with the following two equations stating that each country's income is equal to the sum of its firms' revenues and that the labor market clears for each country:
Summarizing, the primitives of the model that characterize the di↵erent economies are the labor
and the potential producers across industries and e ciencies (m j i (z)) 2 N J⇥I⇥Z . The distribution of producers across industries and e ciencies embody the available technology in each country. Given these primitives and for any vector of country aggregate incomes and wages (Y, w) 2 R 2I ++ , the prices e p j ni (z) and market shares s j ni (z) that appear in expressions (10) and (11) are determined according to our previous discussion of the partial equilibrium in each market n of each good j (e.g., in the particular case of Cournot competition, they are determined by eq. (8)- (9)). The following proposition, which is proven in Appendix A, establishes the existence of a general equilibrium of the economy: 
++ that satisfies the equilibrium conditions (10) and (11).
Absolute Advantage and Quality
This section characterizes the countries' specialization within each good along the quality dimension. First, we introduce our concept of AA. Subsequently, we relate AA to the average quality of exports and also provide a simple characterization of how the ranges of qualities exported by di↵erent countries overlap.
Absolute Advantage
For each industry, how can we order countries according to the e ciency of their firms? That is, how can we define Absolute Advantage? With heterogeneous producers whose e ciencies overlap across countries, the answer is not unique. A natural candidate to order country distributions of firm e ciencies is FOSD. However, if we depart from the DSMC model, FOSD is insu cient to guarantee a basic aggregation property and it is then insu cient to serve as the basis for our analysis. Specifically, we show by means of a numerical example that a country whose distribution of firm e ciencies FOSD another country's does not necessarily have higher average productivity (even if both countries feature identical wage and trade frictions). 14 Thus, predictions involving aggregates such as average productivity, exports and quality appear to require a condition stronger than FOSD to be valid beyond the DSMC model.
Define the average productivity of the firms from country i's that sell good j in market n as
, where l j ni (z) is the amount of labor used by a firm from country i with e ciency z to produce and export j to n. Consider an economy in which Z = {9.75, 10, 12} and the vectors of firms (across e ciency categories) from countries 1 and 2 producing good j are (m j 1 (z)) = (1, 4, 1) and (m j 2 (z)) = (4, 1, 1), respectively. Clearly, the e ciency distribution of firms in country 1 FOSD the distribution in country 2. Suppose that j = d j ni = e p j n = 1 and w i = 95 for both countries i = 1, 2 and a certain destination market n. In the Cournot equilibrium, we find j n1 = 123.8 and 14 A similar example could be built in terms of average e ciency defined as
Hence, although the firm e ciency distribution of country 1 FOSD the distribution of country 2, the average productivity of the exporters from country 2 is greater. To grasp some intuition about the source of the limitations of FOSD for ordering firm e ciency distributions note that although country 1's firm distribution FOSD country 2's, the converse is true if we truncate from below the distributions by excluding the lowest e ciency category (as it would happen if e p j n were slightly lower, so that the least e cient firms exit the market). If we perform this truncation, then the new distributions of firms are (4, 1) for country 1 and (1, 1) for country 2. Also note that in our example, which is built using Cournot, the market shares of the firms with the lowest e ciency have disproportionally small market shares, so that average productivities are almost the same as those that would correspond to the truncated distributions of firms.
The definition of AA in this paper is based on the MLRP. In short, we say that a country has an AA over another country in a given industry if for any two categories of firm e ciency, the ratio of the number of firms in the high-e ciency category to the number in the low-e ciency category is larger in the first country. 16 This property is su cient to ensure some important aggregation properties. Note that the MLRP implies FOSD but the reverse is not true and that, unlike FOSD, the MLRP keeps the same order within a collection of distributions for any truncation of the distributions. For mathematical convenience, we assume that in each country there is a potential firm with the minimal e ciency in each industry 17 and that if a country has any firm in a given e ciency category of an industry, then it also has firms (possibly inactive) in each of the categories corresponding to lower e ciencies. That is, for each i and j, we have m Definition Consider two countries i 0 and i 00 . Country i 0 has an AA over country i 00 in industry j, denoted as i 0 < j AA i 00 , if z j i 0 z j i 00 and for every pair of e ciencies z s and z t such that z s > z t and z t  z j i 00 , we have m
The case i 0 < j AA i 00 and i 00 < There would be a third country that would complete the market equilibrium.
16 In a somewhat similar context with many skill levels, Costinot and Vogel (2010) also use the MLRP to compare skill abundance across countries.
17 Note that because we can consider this minimum e ciency z0 to be arbitrarily small, this assumption does not have any relevance for the equilibrium of the economy. 
Average Quality
We define the average quality of country i's exports of good j to market n as 20
.
Given our definition of AA, quality-biased e ciency is su cient to link AA to average e ciency and quality. However, to link wages and trade frictions to average quality we must impose some additional structure on the patterns of market shares. Higher trade frictions and wages a↵ect average quality through two mechanisms. The first mechanism works through changes in the set of active firms: if the e ciency cuto↵ satisfies @z
, then the least e cient producers leave the market at higher levels of the product d j ni ·w i , thereby raising average quality. This is the type of mechanism emphasized in di↵erent contexts, following Melitz (2003) (e.g., Baldwin
and Harrigan, 2011, on the impact of distance on export quality at the firm level). The second mechanism works through changes in the relative market shares within the set of active firms.
18 Although it is often assumed in the literature that the parameter ✓ is identical across industries and countries, there does not appear to be any empirical basis for this assumption. In fact, if the parameter ✓ is close to 1 (as it has sometimes been found in connection to Zipf's law; see Axtell, 2001) , small di↵erences in this parameter can imply large di↵erences in expected productivity. For example, recalling that E [Z] = z0✓/(✓ 1), we find that a shift from ✓ 0 = 1.01 to ✓ 00 = 1.1 implies a nine-fold di↵erence in the expected firm productivity. 19 Costinot, Donaldson and Komunjer (2012) assume that firm productivities are distributed Fréchet Costinot, Donaldson and Komunjer (2012) to ordering country productivities in a setting with heterogeneous producers is the closest to the approach used in this paper. It is worth noting that taking the scale parameter b z j i in Fréchet distributions as an analog of the location parameter z0 in Pareto distributions could be misleading. Unlike di↵erences in z0 in Pareto distributions, di↵erences in b z j i do not a↵ect the support of the distribution (which may be di cult to justify from an economic point of view). Moreover, any truncation from below (as given by cuto↵s z) of two Pareto distributions with an identical parameter ✓ results in an identical distribution of e ciencies (thereby resulting in identical expected productivity and quality). This is not the case for two Fréchet distributions with an identical parameter ✓ but di↵erent b z j i . 20 In our previous numerical example, we find Q j n1 = 11.2 and Q j n2 = 11.7. Thus, although country 1's firm e ciency distribution FOSD the distribution of country 2, country 2's average quality is higher. Note that the MLRP does not hold in this example.
This mechanism is ignored in the models based on DSMC because the equilibrium of this market structure implies @ 2 lns
However, as noted in the Introduction, as wages and trade frictions increase, the less-e cient firms' market shares could be reduced relatively less than the more-e cient firms' market shares (at least for some range), thereby reducing average exported quality. Contrarily, if @ 2 lns
, then the more-e cient producers have larger relative market shares at higher levels of frictions and wages. In this paper, we consider the following assumption:
A.2 For each j, n, and i there exists an e ciency cuto↵ z
A.2b The condition on
0 holds with strict inequality.
It is straightforward to verify that the Cournot and DSMC equilibria satisfy Assumption A.2.
Moreover, Cournot also satisfies A.2b, whereas in DSMC with a large number of producers we have
The condition on the cross derivative of lns j ni (z) may be better understood with two applications. Consider the relative di↵erence in the market shares in destination n of two firms that have an identical e ciency z but are from two di↵erent countries such that d i 0 w i 0 < d i 00 w i 00 . The condition implies that the relative di↵erences in market shares are smaller when we compare firms with greater e ciency; i.e., s j
Similarly, consider the ratio of a firm's market share in a foreign destination to its market share in the domestic market,
1/e p j i because relative di↵erences in prices cannot exceed trade frictions due to arbitrage). This ratio is greater for more e cient firms; i.e., trade frictions a↵ect relatively less the market share of the more-e cient firms. 22 21 However, in DSMC with a fixed cost of entering each destination market, the condition @z wi/e p j n > 0 has similar implications on the characterization of the equilibrium to those of Assumption A.2b. It is also interesting to note that the di↵erence between DSMC and Cournot with respect to the strict inequality in the cross derivative of lns j ni (z) is potentially important in certain contexts, as in the analysis of the e ciency gains that follow from trade liberalization.
22 The evidence in Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011) on normalized export intensities can be interpreted as supportive of this condition. This index is a normalization of the ratio of a firm's sales in an export market with respect to its sales in the domestic market; i.e., export intensity
, where E j ni 0 (k) denotes exports of j by firm k from i 0 to n andĒ j ni 0 denotes the average of this variable across the exporters from i 0 . Using data for
French firms (i 0 = France) to 113 destinations, they show that 1 >
, where j50 is the median and j95 is the 95th percentile exporter intensity. Furthermore, the latter ratio is about 2 orders of magnitude Now, we can link export quality to AA, wages and trade frictions as follows: 23
Proposition 2 Consider an equilibrium in which two countries i 0 and i 00 export good j to market n (n 6 = i 0 , i 00 ) and suppose that e ciency is quality-biased in industry j and Assumption A.2 holds. If 
The Range of Exported Qualities
The model's equilibrium suggests a structure of international trade in which there is no complete specialization in any dimension: each good tends to be exported to each market by multiple firms from a variable number of countries; each country exports a wide range of qualities for each of its exported goods; and each country's range of exported qualities for each good is likely to overlap with other countries' ranges. We now examine some immediate predictions with regard to the overlap of the ranges of exported qualities for each good. We consider the particular characterization of the Cournot equilibrium although qualitatively similar arguments could be made invoking Assumption A.2 instead of equation (8).
From expressions (5) and (8), we have that if country i exports good j to destination n (i.e., if
Therefore, for the set of countries that satisfy z j ni < z j i , the highest quality being exported to n is sourced from the country that has an AA in j over the other countries (i.e., it has the highest z j i ). In turn, the lowest qualities are exported from the countries with the lowest wages and trade frictions. If the di↵erences in trade frictions d j ni across source countries are relatively small, then the lowest quality is exported by the country that has the lowest wage. Additionally, among exporters with similar wage levels, the closest country to the destination market is expected to export the lowest quality.
The first point, which is related to AA, is the most novel and implies that the highest qualities may not be exported by the richest countries. Although most rich countries are likely to have an AA over most poor countries in most industries, this technical supremacy cannot be taken or more below 1 and the di↵erence between this ratio and 1 appears to increase as the destination n becomes less popular (which can be interpreted as a signal of a greater trade friction d ni 0 ). In terms of our variables, the previous inequalities are equivalent toĒ
. This implies that the most export oriented firms have much larger relative market shares s j ni 0 (k)/s j i 0 i 0 (k) than the remaining exporters. As long as the most export oriented firms are also the most e cient ones, this evidence is supportive of Assumption A.2.
23 Most propositions in this paper state the conditions in the hypothesis in terms of wages and incomes (in addition to AA and trade frictions). In Appendix C, we sketch a version of the model along the lines of the probabilistic trade models with a continuum of potential producers Kortum, 2002 and 2010) that could serve as the basis to restate the propositions in terms of exogenous general-state-of-technology parameters Ti and labor supplies Li.
24 Similarly, we could also show that
for granted for all industries and all bilateral relationships. In combination with the other two predictions indicated in the paragraph above, this point implies that, for each good, the spectrums of qualities that are exported by the di↵erent countries can overlap in non-trivial ways. Figures   2a and 2b illustrate this point. The figures consider two countries R and P that export good j to destination n, such that w R > w P and d In the first case, country R exports the highest quality, whereas country P exports the lowest quality. In the second case, the poorer country P exports the highest as well as the lowest quality (and everything in between). Meanwhile, the richer country R only exports a proper subset of the qualities exported by P . 25
Specialization across Goods and Export Quality
In this Section, we link country horizontal specialization in a given good and wage to the average export quality of this good. This analysis requires extending the model to endogenize the number of firms. The reason is that the volume of exports of a given industry (and therefore, horizontal specialization) depends not only on the average exports per firm but also on the number of firms in the industry. This extension of the model is described in Subsection 4.1, in which we introduce a zero-profit entry condition. Then, in Subsection 4.2, we show that, conditional on having a lower wage, a country having an AA in good j over another country will have a greater international specialization in j, as measured by the ratio E j i /Y i (where E j ni is country i' exports of j to destination n and E j i is its total exports of j; i.e., E
. Given Assumption A.5 below, a corollary of this latter result is that if a country shows higher specialization in good j and a higher wage, then it must have an AA in good j. Finally, combining these arguments with Proposition 2 we find that higher specialization in j and a higher wage lead to a greater average quality of the exports of j.
25 As an example, consider the exports of co↵ee by Guatemala, Ethiopia, and Mexico. Guatemala's and Ethiopia's per capita incomes are far below that of Mexico and their exports of unprocessed co↵ee have an average price that is slightly lower than Mexico's exports (as for 2006). This lower average price of exports from Guatemala and Ethiopia is likely to be the consequence of the export of some low quality co↵ees whose production is nonetheless profitable due to the low wages in these two countries. However, Guatemala and Ethiopia also produce some of the most expensive and appreciated co↵ee varieties in the world, which are unmatched in Mexico's production. This suggests that the richer country (Mexico) exports a proper subset of the qualities exported by the poorer countries (Guatemala and Ethiopia).
The Model Extended
We now introduce in the model a zero-profit entry condition that is motivated by the equilibrium that would result from a dynamic entry processà la Melitz (2003) . However, this is a static model in which we do not specify the dynamics of entry but impose the zero-profit condition as an assumption. In Melitz's setting (amended here to consider di↵erences across industries), there is an unbounded pool of prospective entrants into each country's industry who are identical prior to entry. To enter industry j, firms must first pay a sunk entry cost j > 0, which is measured in labor units. Entrants in industry j of country i then draw their e ciency parameter z from a probability distribution with support Z and density f 
Furthermore, we reinforce our definition of AA with an additional condition (A.4) and we explicitly impose the AA ordering across countries for each industry (A.5), as follows:
A.4 If i 0 < j AA i 00 , then for every pair of e ciencies z t and z s in Z such that z s z t we have
A.5 For each j and every pair of countries i 0 and i 00 , either i 0 j AA i 00 , i 00 j AA i 0 or i 0 ⇠ j AA i 00 .
Note that the MLRP condition on the densities f j i (z) (in Assumption A.4) is a condition on the ex ante distribution of firm e ciencies, whereas the MLRP condition on the m j i (z) (used in the definition of AA) is a condition on the actual distribution of firm e ciencies. Certainly, if there were a continuum of firms per industry, the actual distribution of e ciencies would be the same as the distribution of the generating process of e ciencies f j i (z). However, because the actual number of firms is a finite number, it is possible that MLRP holds for f j i (z) but MLRP does not hold for m j i (z). Hence, we impose the MLRP on both the generating process and the actual distribution of e ciencies. 27 26 This assumption is stronger than the conditions that would hold from free entry in a dynamic model with an integer number of firms. Those conditions would be given in terms of inequalities and would make the characterization of the equilibrium very intricate.
27 At any rate, imposing the MLRP on both the generating process and the actual distribution of e ciencies is not a stronger assumption than the standard assumption of a continuum of firms whose e ciency is exactly distributed according to a particular distribution such as Pareto.
Specialization across Goods and Quality
Conditional on size and trade frictions, a country that has an AA in j and a lower wage will appear to be relatively specialized in the good j. The argument can be outlined as follows. Clearly, individual firms that have higher e ciency and pay a lower wage export more and have higher profits. Then, at the country level, the MLRP used to define AA and Assumption A.2 ensure that average exports are well-behaved ; i.e., the average firm of a country with an AA on j and a lower wage will export more of j. Next, we must consider how the number of firms in this country's industry j is a↵ected by the higher AA and the lower wage. Everything else being equal, potential entrants to industry j in this country have greater expected profits than entrants to other countries.
The non-profit entry condition A.3 is then fulfilled by having a lower price index e p j i in this country. In fact, the necessary condition for this mechanism to work is that a decrease in the domestic industry price index e p j i reduces the profits of domestic firms relatively more than the profits of the exporters to this country (see Assumption A.6 below). In this way, from the perspective of potential entrants to the country that has an AA on j and a lower wage, the lower price level of j at home balances out the larger expected profits from exports. 28 Next, the lower price level of j in the country with the AA and a lower wage implies greater demand for j in this market as well as lower imports (foreign firms find this market less profitable).
Therefore, the total sales of the domestic firms in this country must be greater than the total sales of the domestic firms in the other countries (this is achieved by a combination of having a greater fraction of more-e cient firms and a larger number of firms). In turn, larger total sales by this country's firms in their very competitive domestic market (the tougher competition materializes in the lower price index e p j i ) imply larger exports to other destinations. This result is made precise in the next proposition and the formal arguments are provided in the corresponding proof in Appendix A. Before, we state Assumption A.6 as follows:
A.6 For each j, we can define a positive valued function of the ratio e c j ni (z)/e p j n , which we denote
Note that the operating profit that a seller from source i obtains in destination n can be written as
It is then straightforward to verify that the Cournot (except for a firm that has a market share of 0.5 or more) and DSMC models are consistent with Assumption 28 A lower price index e p j i means that, on average, the good j is cheaper in country i for a given quality. Because the average quality in the market of the country with the AA is higher, it might be that the average price of good j without adjusting for quality is also higher in this market.
A.6 by noting that for these market structures ⇡ j To better understand the assumption @ 2 ⇡ j /@d ni @ ⇣ w i /e p j n ⌘ > 0, consider the following implication that compares two producers from two di↵erent countries that have the same e ciency and pay the same wage. An increase in their output price index in one of the domestic markets benefits the domestic producer more than the exporter to this market; i.e., if e p 0 > e p > 0, then 2. country i 0 has a greater international specialization in good j; i.e., E
Moreover, if in addition to the previous conditions, i 0 j AA i 00 and Assumption A.2b holds, then
Next, we link horizontal specialization (rather than AA, which we did in Section 3) to quality.
The following corollary is an intermediate step in showing this link.
Corollary 4 Consider an equilibrium in which two countries i 0 and i 00 export good j, and let Assumptions A.2 A.6 hold. If Corollary 5 Consider an equilibrium in which two countries i 0 and i 00 export good j to market n (n 6 = i 0 , i 00 ), and let Assumptions A.2 A.6 hold. Suppose that e ciency in industry j is quality- 
US imports of Apparel and Clothing Accessories
The measurement of quality involves serious methodological issues and remains an active area of research. 30 For instance, prices might not be a good proxy for quality. More-e cient producers may sell at lower prices in monopolistic competition markets in spite of producing higher quality because they may apply identical markups as the less-e cient producers and have lower marginal costs. 31 This is especially problematic for the use of prices as a proxy for quality when, as in this paper, we are interested in the link between relatively high sales (horizontal specialization), which may tend to be associated to lower prices, and high quality. Thus, a systematic test of the predictions in this paper's model would require a specific e↵ort on the measurement of quality and is left for future research. However, it is convenient to provide an empirical illustration of the main prediction of the paper. Note that, although low unit values might not be indicative of low quality if relative sales are high, high unit values and high relative sales are di cult to explain without referring to high quality. We exploit this circumstance to use unit values as proxies for quality to explore the correlation between horizontal specialization and the average unit value of exports in the apparel and clothing accessories sector.
We use the data on exports to the US of the 233 6-digit products included in chapters 61 and 62 (apparel and clothing accessories) of the Harmonized System nomenclature, revision 1996. This sector exhibits some interesting characteristics for this exercise: it is the manufacturing sector with the largest set of exporting countries to the US (over 100 exporters that include low-, medium-, and high-income countries); it contains many di↵erent 6-digit products (233); and unit values show significant di↵erences (after elimination of outliers, the coe cient of variation of the product unit prices across countries is 1.02 when averaged across the 233 products). Using a single destination country (the US) has the advantage of eliminating the necessity to control for potentially relevant 30 Khandelwal (2010), Hallak and Schott (2011), and Romalis (2012) are important contributions in this respect.
31 Moreover, in industries exhibiting decreasing marginal costs, more-e cient firms may have even higher incentives to reduce prices regardless of their potentially higher quality. Recent estimates indicate the existence of significant increasing returns to scale in most industries that go beyond the existence of a fixed cost (Diewert and Fox, 2008) . In this respect, the textile industry may be one of the least problematic in using use price as a proxy for quality because it is one of the very few sectors for which increasing returns are rejected. characteristics of the destination market. 32
Empirical Procedure
We run two types of regressions. First, we pool in the same regressions all of the 233 products.
Thus, the first equation to be estimated is
where superscript j indicates one of the 233 products at the 6-digit level, p j US,i is the average unit value of country i's exports of good j to the US (the ratio of the value of exports over the quantity exported), j 1 is a product j fixed e↵ect to control for di↵erences in unit values across goods, HS j i is the measure of the horizontal specialization of country i in good j, P CGDP i is the exporter's per capita GDP used as a proxy for its wage level, d US,i is the average distance between the exporter's major cities and the US's major cities, GDP i is the exporter's GDP, and u j i is the error term. Second, we run independent panel regressions for each product j using annual data for a short period of time, as follows:
where subscript t indicates the time period, and j 1t is a time fixed e↵ect to control for di↵erences in unit values across time. Each of these two types of regressions is run using two alternative HS j i measures: the share of exports of j in the country's GDP (E j i /GDP i ), which is the measure that directly stems from the theoretical model; and the country's revealed comparative advantage in j (RCA
, where E i ⌘ P J j=1 E j i and subscript W refers to world magnitudes), which is Balassa (1965)'s popular measure of specialization across goods. 33 32 The production of an important portion of the apparel and clothing accessories sector has been o↵shored from rich countries to low-wage countries. However, o↵shoring does not necessarily break the link between AA and quality, conditional on wages. The firms that o↵shore the production of the higher-quality varieties are expected to search for more experienced workers and middle managers. Because these factors are more likely to be found in countries that already have a specialization in the industry, the o↵shoring of the higher-quality products is more likely to be directed toward countries whose specialization in the industry is already high (for a given wage level).
33 As an additional control for country i's market access (or trade frictions), we could include the ratio of total exports to GDP, Ei/GDPi, in the equation. It turns out that if we include this variable, it is then indi↵erent to use the ratio E 
We also estimated this last equation and found Ei/GDPi to be not significant, whereas the coe cients and significance for the remaining variables were almost identical to those found in the estimation of equation (12) with
Note that the use of these two measures of horizontal specialization in these regressions may involve two potential econometric problems. 
as one of the components, measurement errors in E j US,i could be carried into E
represents an important component of E j i , the estimation of j 2 could have an upward bias. Second, US country-specific trade barriers and agreements can simultaneously a↵ect the total value of a country's exports to the US (and to the world because the US market could be a significant portion of the world market) and the average unit value of exports to the US. Specifically, tari↵s and quotas tend to increase the import unit values (because they tend to increase the average quality of imports for similar reasons as those stemming from higher transportation costs) while reducing the total volume of these imports. Thus, from the point of view of the exporting country, tari↵s and quotas on a given good tend to reduce the volume of exports (and, therefore, the specialization of the country) in that good, while the export unit value of the good increases. The opposite e↵ects would occur in the case of preferential trade agreements. 34 All of these phenomena (tari↵s, quotas and preferential trade agreements) would introduce a negative bias in the estimation of
Thus, country i's exports of j to the US, E This may explain why the estimated coe cients for Ei/GDPi and RCA j i are so similar in Table 1 . 34 FDI by large importing discount chain stores (e.g., Wal-Mart and Kmart) could also have similar (symmetric) e↵ects: they would simultaneously increase a country's exports to the US and the world while lowering the unit value of its exports to the US. See Gere↵ (1999) for the importance of large chain stores for imports of apparel.
Data
The trade data on quantities (in Tons) Although the data from BACI have previously been verified for consistency, they still contain a noticeable number of outliers. Moreover, for each product, some of the countries are reported to export an extremely small number of units to the US. These small numbers raise doubts about the true character of the countries as producers and exporters of the product. The observations for these countries are likely to reflect marginal and atypical commercial activities and re-exports. To avoid allowing the econometric results to depend on a small number of outliers and on minuscule occasional exporters, two filters are applied to these data. First, for each product at the 6-digit level, we exclude all observations whose import unit value is larger than 10 times or smaller than 1/10 of the median unit value of the corresponding year. Second, for each product, we drop all observations from countries whose exports in physical units are less than 1/10,000 of the mean export per country in the sample.
The data on the distances between the exporters and the US are based on the weighted bilateral distances between the countries' largest cities, as also provided by the CEPII. P CGDP and GDP data are from the WDI of the World Bank and correspond to the PPP values in constant 2005 international dollars. Table 1 summarizes the results from the estimation of equation (12) Standard errors are computed clustering by country. In all of the four regressions, both measures of 35 BACI is the world trade database developed by the CEPII, which provides bilateral values and quantities of exports at the HS 6-digit product disaggregation. This database uses original data provided by the United Nations Statistical Division (COMTRADE database) and reconciles the declarations of the exporter and the importer. See Gaulier and Zignago (2010) for details. 36 The measures of horizontal specialization that exclude the exports to the US have a very high predicting power for the measures that include them. For instance, the F statistics of the first stage regressions of all of the IV estimations that include the RCA measure in either of the two tables, are never below 100. horizontal specialization are positive and significant at the 1% level and show a very similar positive coe cient. Furthermore, P CGDP is always positive and significant, which is consistent with the previous results in the literature (e.g., Schott 2004), whereas the remaining controls (distance and exporter size) are not significant at any level. Table 2 summarizes the results from independent estimations of equation (12a) The estimates for the remaining coe cients deserve some brief comments. Nearly all of the products show a positive and significant coe cient for exporter per capita GDP. Thus, far from reducing the significance of PCGDP for export unit values, regressing it together with a measure of horizontal specialization appears to increase its significance. Distance appears not to be significant for apparel products, 37 whereas exporter size is positively correlated with average quality for a sizable portion of products. This latter e↵ect deserves further investigation in the future. 38 Overall, the data on the exports of apparel and clothing accessories to the US appear to be consistent with the main implication of the model. Conditional on income, higher international specialization in apparel and clothing accessories tends to be associated with higher average export quality as proxied by unit values. However, this is a very limited empirical exercise. Because unit values might not be a good proxy for quality in many industries, conducting a systematic empirical test of the predictions of this model's paper will require a more sophisticated empirical approach 37 This result is not inconsistent with previous studies. Although export prices and distance to destination are positively correlated in most industries (Baldwin and Harrigan, 2010), Johnson (2012) finds that prices are decreasing in the di culty of entering the destination markets in several important industries that include apparel. 38 The following argument could help explain a positive sign of GDP. If conditional on AA, GDP size has a negative e↵ect on horizontal specialization in the apparel and clothing accessories sector (e.g., because, in contrast to other sectors, there are no economies of scale in this sector), then a large GDP and high specialization would be indicative of a high AA in this sector and, therefore, we would expect higher average export quality. At any rate, an exploration of this argument would require an analysis of the e↵ect of size on horizontal specialization that is beyond the scope of this paper.
Results
to capture quality than the approach applied in this exercise.
Concluding Comments
Empirical research has documented the importance of country specialization across both the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of goods when characterizing the current patterns of trade. This paper analyzes the interaction between these two dimensions of specialization. In the equilibrium of this paper's model, each good tends to be exported to each market by a finite number of heterogeneous producers from more than one country. Moreover, each country exports a range of qualities for each good that overlaps with the ranges of other countries following non-trivial patterns that relate to di↵erences in wages, trade frictions and absolute advantage. The main result is that, conditional on wages and other variables and specifications, the average quality of a country's exports in a given industry increases with the country's international specialization in the industry.
There appears to be a number of relevant directions for further research. Introducing demand non-homotheticities in the model and conducting a systematic empirical investigation of its predictions are two of these directions. Also, the combination of the MLRP assumption on the firm e ciency distributions and the assumptions on the cross-derivatives of market shares and operating profits that we use here appear to provide a fruitful and fairly general basis for the analysis of aggregates in models with heterogeneous producers. This combination of assumptions may aid in generalizing prior results in the trade literature that have been developed under particular e ciency distributions such as Pareto or particular market structures such as DSMC. From the point of view of economic policy, a frequent goal of advanced countries in light of the increasing competition from lower-wage countries is to increase their specialization in the higher-quality varieties of each good.
The analysis in this paper of the connection between the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of specialization may help to understand in which industries a country has better opportunities to evolve from exporting quantity to exporting quality. 
A Relegated Proofs of the Propositions
We borrow some concepts from statistics as follows. Let G i (z) be a cumulative distribution function 
Proof of Lemma 1
To show that i 0 < j AA i 00 implies G i 0 (z) < F OSD G i 00 (z), we proceed by contradiction and suppose that there is z t 2 Z, z t  z j i 00 , such that G i 0 (z t ) > G i 00 (z t ). Thus,
To verify that the denominators are strictly positive, note that the hypothesis 0  G i 00 (z t ) < 
Compare the two numerators. As m
for every z 2 Z and z z t (because i 0 < j AA i 00 ), and h(z) is positive valued, we have 
. These two inequalities contradict the inequality in (14) and, therefore, the initial hypothesis. Hence, 
The first mapping is just expression (10) for each country's income, whereas the second mapping is a simple continuous transformation of the labor excess demand for each country that corresponds to expression (11). In order to extend the domain of i (Y, w) and i (Y, w) to all the vectors in R 2I + we have to check their boundedness as Y i or w i go to zero for some i. Market shares are bounded between 0 and 1 (the bound is implied by the market equilibrium condi-
, and so are the functions i (Y, w). In turn, the functions i (Y, w) are also bounded between 0 and 1 (note that 0 < ( L i ) 2 < 1). Thus, we define
, where the sequences {(Y, w)} take values in R 2I ++ . Now, let 2I be the standard 2I-dimensional simplex 2I = n 2 R 2I | i 0, and
Define the mapping ( ) : 2I ! 2I as follows: 39
. . . Next, let us confirm that the fixed point (Y ⇤ , w ⇤ ) solves (10) and (11), and is strictly positive.
First, we show that ⇤ ⌘ (Y ⇤ , w ⇤ ) = 1. Consider the product of ⇤ times the sum of the first I components of (Y ⇤ , w ⇤ ). Recalling P J j=1 ↵ j = 1 and
i (z) = 1, we get:
and therefore (10) for every i = 1, . . . , I. Similarly, it implies that (Y ⇤ , w ⇤ ) solves w ⇤ i =¯ i (Y ⇤ , w ⇤ ) and therefore (11) for every i = 1, . . . , I. 
Proof of Proposition 2
In this proof we compare the exports of good j from two countries's (i 0 and i 00 ) to destination n. For brevity, we suppress the superscript j and the subscript n from all the variables. Note that P z2Z s i (z)m i (z) > 0 for some z 2 Z and i = i 0 , i 00 because both countries export j to n. For each i = i 0 , i 00 consider the following system of weights for each e ciency category z 2 Z:
. We now proceed through two claims.
The mapping s i (z) : Z ! R + is identical for both i 0 and i 00 becausec i 0 (z) =c i 00 (z) and is strictly positive for z = z j i 0 and z = z j i 00 because both countries export to n. Hence, we can apply Lemma 1 with h(z) = s i (z)/q(z), which implies
Then, recalling that q(z) strictly increases with z because j > 0 and using the basic properties of F OSD, we conclude that Q i 0 Q i 00 if i 0 < 
for the e ciencies of the exporters of j to n), and note that P
which implies G i 0 (z) = G i 00 (z) and, therefore, G i 0 (z) < F OSD G i 00 (z). Hence, because q(z) increases with z, we have Q i 0 Q i 00 . Alternatively, suppose that @ln [s i (z)] /@(d i w i ) strictly increases with z (Assumption A.2b). Then, to satisfy P 
Proof of Proposition 3
We proceed through a series of four claims:
ni 00 (z) for each z and each third country n 6 = i 0 , i 00 . Moreover,
; second, we show that country-i 0 firms' total share in each third country destination n 6 = i 0 , i 00 is also larger; third, we show that for the exports between i 0 and i 00 , we have 
Furthermore, s 
where C 1 ⌘ P (9) implies that e p j n is always positive valued. Second, the price e p j n is clearly continuous at wages (w) such that no firm category z goes from being active to being inactive (i.e., at any (w) such that for each z and i, either z > z j ni or z < z j ni ). Third, e p j n is also continuous at wages such that some firms go from inactive to active (i.e., at (w) such that z 
C Sketch of the Model with a Continuum of Goods
In this Appendix, we outline how the model could be amended along the lines of probabilistic trade models with a continuum of goods (e.g., Kortum, 2002 and 2010) . This could allow rewriting the propositions in terms of exogenous variables; specifically, it could allow substituting the endogenous wages w i and incomes Y i in the hypotheses of the propositions with country generalstate-of-technology parameters T i and the labor supplies L i , respectively. This could be interesting from a theoretical point of view although, from an empirical perspective, what we can directly observe is not aggregate technology parameters but wages or income per capita. The basic idea is that as the number J of goods becomes large and because of the Law of Large Numbers, two economies that have identical primitives (i.e., general state of the technology T i , labor force L i , and market access d i ) will tend in equilibrium toward identical aggregate endogenous variables (w i , Y i and total exports E i ) regardless of potentially large di↵erences in e ciency, output and exports in each particular industry. It must be emphasized that the goal of this appendix is not to fully Figure 2b) , the higher-wage country R (resp. the lower-wage country P ) has an absolute advantage in good j. Results of regressing the unit value of the exports of good j to the US on di↵erent measures of the exporting country's horizontal specialization (E exU S,j /GDP , E j /GDP , RCA exU S,j and RCA j ). As additional controls, the estimated equation includes exporter PPP per capita income (P CGDP ), the distance between the US and the exporter, and exporter P P P GDP (see equation (12)). All the variables are in logs and all specifications include 233 commodity fixed e↵ects. Columns (1) and (3) use least squares, whereas columns (2) and (4) use two-stage least squares. In the 2SLS regressions, E exU S,j /GDP is used as an instrument of E j /GDP and RCA exU S,j as an instrument of RCA j . Standard errors shown in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by country. All data correspond to 2006. *** means significant at 0.01-percent. Panel data regressions of the unit value of the exports of good j to the US on two measures of the exporting country's horizontal specialization: E j /GDP and RCA j . The estimation method is two-stage least squares. E exU S,j /GDP is used as an instrument of E j /GDP in panel 1 and RCA exU S,j as an instrument of RCA j in panel 2. In addition to including one of the measures of specialization, the equations also include exporter PPP per capita income (P CGDP ), the distance between the US and the exporter, exporter P P P GDP , and a constant (see equation (12a)). All the variables are in logs. The same two equations (one corresponding to each panel) were independently estimated for each of the 6-digit products in chapters 61 and 62 of the HS96 (articles of apparel and clothing accessories) with an average of at least 50 observations (or exporting countries) per year. 
